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On November 9th, 2016, voters decided that Donald Trump will become 
the 45th president of the United States of America. Without a doubt, the 
recent election campaign together with candidates involved, especially the 
new President-elect, his speeches and statements were one of the most 
discussed ones in the US history. It seems that the US presidential 
elections have never created so much confusion and anxiety within the 
international community, especially in regard to the future course of 
foreign policy of the currently mightiest military power in the world. This 
is gaining particular significance as the new president will inherit the 
longest foreign war in the country’s history from the outgoing president 
Barack Obama. Having said this, Mr. Trump will soon be confronted with 
an extraordinary complex puzzle demanding his attitude towards numerous 
interrelated crucial questions.  
Dr. Siegfried O.Wolf 
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First of all, what position he will take on the ongoing US military mission in Afghanistan, 
which is confronted with a deteriorating security situation coursed by increasing Jihadist 
attacks and armed insurgencies. Against this backdrop, Trump will have to find a strategy in 
dealing with the Taliban. The question is how will he identify the Islamist militant movement 
as a terrorist actor and subsequently declare it unacceptable for any negotiation process for 
peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. In this context, we shall also ask what will be his 
response towards Islamabad’s financial support for terrorist groups using Pakistani soil for the 
purpose of launching cross-border activities in order to weaken the national administration in 
Kabul. Moreover, another significant issue is rising in this context: What will be the future US 
relations with the National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan which is currently 
known more for its growing internal rifts and an increasing personal authoritarian style of 
governance by President Ashraf Ghani? Having this in mind, will Trump continue to deepen 
the US-India relations and further support New Delhi’s increasing role in Afghanistan, 
particularly when it comes to the growing defense collaboration between New Delhi and 
Kabul? Furthermore, how will Trump deal with China’s emergence as one of the major actors 
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region as well as in neighboring Kashmir, South Asia’s 
major flashpoint? Finally, showing a ‘soft-corner’ for President Vladimir Putin’s ‘aggressive 
assertiveness’ in international conflicts, Trump will need to find a way to manage the 
upcoming joint Russian-Chinese interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Considering the 
deterioration of India-Pakistan relations and the increasing protests of New Delhi against the 
illegal use of disputed land for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) development 
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project, the appearance of Moscow as an additional player will complicate Trumps future ties 
with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 
Briefly speaking, it is far too early, and based on pre-election statements, which policy 
directions will the next US President take in case of South Asia and the Af-Pak region in 
particular. However, there are some indications that the new president will most likely follow 
the approach towards the Af-Pak region set by his predecessor.  
Although some statements about Trump’s potential Af-Pak policy can be made already now: 
Firstly, he will most likely identify the Taliban as radical Islamist terrorist group. However, the 
unwillingness of the Taliban to enter severe and sustainable peace negotiations as the sole 
instrument to solve the Afghan conflict will be demonstrated by Trump in Pakistan as the 
major roadblock for stability in Afghanistan. In addition, the disillusion of any constructive 
role of Pakistan in case of the last attempts to engage the Taliban and Afghan governments in 
peace talks will most likely continue. As such, one should rather expect an intensified search 
for peace opportunities going beyond Pakistan’s participation. This refers to a process which 
was recently revived in Doha where the Taliban maintain its ‘political liaison office’. Being 
known for having not much passion, Trump will most likely continue with the Afghan peace 
process based on the bilateral negotiations between Afghan Taliban & Afghan government 
with the US as an ‘observer’.  
Secondly, Trump will probably disappoint Pakistani and Taliban hopes that the US will totally 
withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. In contrast, he might maintain Washington’s interests in 
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the region and continue to promote the current robust (offensive) mandate of the 
contemporary US military mission in Afghanistan. Being rather convinced of the efficacy of 
air power than of ground forces, one would expect that the new US administration will 
continue to use the drones as a major instrument to strike insurgency and terrorist elements on 
both sides of the Durand Line, the actual Afghan-Pakistan border. Trump might also partly 
follow the military strategy of President Obama. However, in contrast to the current 
government, he will most likely increase pressure on Pakistan’s civilian and military 
leadership to end their support for cross-border terrorist groups and combat respective groups. 
In this context, one can also expect the ongoing US ignorance of India’s military operations 
(surgical strikes) beyond the Line of Control (LoC) that attack the terrorist camps in Pakistan 
controlled Kashmir. 
Thirdly, Trump will continue to support the cooperation approach of President Obama towards 
India and, as such, Washington and New Delhi will share similar views regarding the 
Pakistan’s involvement in state-sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, which affects 
Afghanistan as well as India. As such, it would mark a clear departure from policy of the 
Obama administration, not declare Pakistan as a ‘terror state’.) This would involve the 
continuation of Washington’s support for Afghanistan-India defense cooperation. Earlier this 
year, considering the resurgence of the Jihadist insurgents and the fragile domestic political 
structure, New Delhi offered Kabul “full support for boosting Afghanistan’s defense 
capabilities to preserve its unity and territorial integrity”. Nevertheless, Pakistan perceives any 
Indian activity in Afghanistan as a challenge to its own interests and security. Against this 
 4
 
 COMMENT
backdrop, an increase in military collaboration between New Delhi and Kabul will most likely 
provoke harsh reaction among Pakistan’s security circles. In the eyes of the Pakistanis, Indian 
support for the build-up of Afghan armed forces will not only directly improve New Delhi’s 
leverage within Afghan’s security sector but also indirectly weaken the Taliban and other pro-
Pakistani militant forces like the Haqqani Network. In other words, it is highly unlikely that 
Pakistan’s military and intelligence will abandon cross-border terrorism as its defense strategy. 
In consequence, if Trump decided not to break up with Pakistan completely, by following the 
same path like Obama, he might face certain limitations in pushing India’s role in 
Afghanistan.  
Last but not least, by taking everything into account, the ongoing geostrategic shifts in the 
regions, especially the image of China as a major player within the Af-Pak/Kashmir region 
(mainly due to the CPEC), one should not expect any crucial changes regarding the support 
for the Afghan government by Washington in the short-run perspective. Any withdrawal of the 
support for the current NUG would not only further entrench the existing fissures, but also 
create more opportunities for China and Pakistan to gain political leverage in Kabul. As a 
result, Trump will not have much room to maneuver when it comes to the current relations 
between his administration and the NUG. Any Russian involvement in the region will further 
enhance the abovementioned trajectories. To sum up, Trump’s approach towards Afghanistan-
Pakistan will differ in many aspects from the ones of Barack Obama. However, it seems 
highly unlikely that the region would witness a tectonic shift in Washington’s South Asia 
policies during the following years. 
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